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ERRATA TO THE REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appellant, Jack E. Hoggan, by and through his counsel Bullock Law Firm, submits 
this Errata to the Reply Brief of the Appellant which was filed in this case on Friday, 
July 21, 2006. 
The purpose of this errata is to correct mistakes in the printing of the Reply Brief 
of the Appellant. 
First, the cover page states that this matter is "IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS." 
By order of the Court dated July 17, 2006, this matter has been recalled to the Utah 
Supreme Court. Therefore, the cover page should state that this matter is "IN THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT." 
The second mistake is found on page i within the Table of Contents and on page 2 
within the Argument of the brief. The title of argument point "II" incorrectly states the 
name of the Appellant, rather than those of the Appellees. Therefore the title incorrectly 
reads: 
"II. JACK URGES THE COURT TO REFORM THE TRUST DOCUMENT BY 
APPLICATION OF THE AFFIRM ON ANY GROUND RULE. HOWEVER, ON 
TWO SEPARATE BASES, REFORMATION OF THE LEONA E . HOGGAN 
FAMILY TRUST IS NOT APPROPRIATE." (Emphasis added under incorrect 
information).. 
The title for the second section of the Reply Brief of the Appellant should read: 
II. THE TRUSTEE, BILL AND JILENE URGE THE COURT TO REFORM THE 
TRUST DOCUMENT BY APPLICATION OF THE AFFIRM ON ANY GROUND 
RULE. HOWEVER, ON TWO SEPARATE BASES, REFORMATION OF THE 
LEONA E. HOGGAN FAMILY TRUST IS NOT APPROPRIATE. (Emphasis 
added under corrected information). 
The argument of the second section correctly states the position of the Appellant. 
The last mistake is found on the 9th line of page 7, where the word "hearing" was 
mistakenly printed as uh21 earing." 
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ARGUMENT 
I. JACK RELIES ON THE DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN THE BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANT REGARDING THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE RULINGS OF THE 
COURT IN BANKS AND FLAKE. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant Jack E. Hoggan has set forth persuasive argument 
concerning the error of the trial court in interpreting the Hoggan trust document in the 
Brief of the Appellant at pages 16-25. Jack continues to rely on such argument and 
urges the Court to issue guidance on the application of the Banks decision and the Flake 
decision with respect to proper interpretation and drafting of trust documents with 
respect to changes to beneficial interests.1 
1
 Jack also contends that further guidance from the Court as to interpretation of trust 
documents is required also so that the trial and appellate courts do not encounter myriad 
cases regarding trust interpretation resulting from minute portions of text in the trust 
agreements. For example, in the agreement setting forth the terms and provisions of 
the Leona E. Hoggan Family Trust, Article XI provided in relevant part that: 
" As long as the Undersigned is alive, she reserves the right, [sic] to amend, 
modify, revoke, or remove from this Trust any and all property that she has 
contributed, in whole or in part, including the principal, and the present or 
past undisbursed income from such principal..." (Emphasis added). 
One point of Jack's argument to the trial court was that this language did not give 
Leona the right to amend, modify, revoke or remove from the trust agreement certain 
language setting forth the terms and provisions of the trust, but upon a literal reading of 
the plain language only could mean that Leona had the power to add to, substitute, 
change, remove ie. amend, modify, revoke, the tangible and intangible property, that 
is the corpus, of the trust. See, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition and Reply, pp. 
15-71, R. 680-682, and Plaintiff's Memorandum on the Effect of the decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court in In the Matter of the Estate of Almon / . Flake, pp. 6-8, R. 862-
864. 
The response of the Trustee, Bill and Jilene was to the effect that this argument 
was "strained" and "non-sensical" and pointed out that the document at issues in the 
Flake case had similar language. It was also noted that one does not "amend" or 
"modify" property. See, Reply Memorandum in Support of Trustee's Motion for 
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II. JACK URGES THE COURT TO REFORM THE TRUST DOCUMENT BY APPLICATION OF 
THE AFFIRM ON ANY GROUND RULE. HOWEVER, ON TWO SEPARATE BASES, 
REFORMATION OF THE LEONA E . HOGGAN FAMILY TRUST IS NOT APPROPRIATE. 
"In the limited circumstance that an appellate court chooses to affirm on an alternate 
ground, it may do so only where the alternate ground is apparent on the record. When an alternate 
theory is apparent on the record, the court of appeals must then determine whether the facts as 
found by the trial court are sufficient to sustain the decision of the trial court on the alternate 
ground. The court of appeals is limited to the findings of fact made by the trial court and may not 
find new facts or re weigh the evidence in light of the new legal theory or alternate ground." 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, \ 20. 
A. Both Utah statutory law and the Restatement (Second) of Trusts support 
the concept of reformation of a trust instrument, however no guidance 
has been given which would support reformation where the settlor is 
now deceased absent clear and convincing evidence of intent. 
Jack, and Bill and Jilene, have both presented to the trial court their positions on 
whether or not reformation is an available remedy in the context of a trust. As both 
parties have acknowledged either before the trial court or in the Brief of the Appellee at 
pp. 28-29, this Court has applied the equitable reformation doctrine in three cases, 
however none of the cases involved a trust or other estate planning documentation, but 
Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 5-6, R. 1030-1031, and Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Declaratory Relief, pp. 4-5, 
R. 1042-1043. 
The objections of Bill and Jilene to the effect that one does not "amend" or 
"modify," help Jack to prove his point that by relying on interpretation of minute 
language, no trust agreement remains safe from attack and prolonged litigation if such 
minute differences are distinguished and the courts are called upon to interpret each 
document. 
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rather involved land sale contracts and deeds. See, Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520 
(Utah 1980), Peterson v. Eldredge, 246 P.2d 886 (Utah 1952), and Sine v. Harper, 111 
P.2d 571 (Utah 1950)(in each case there were two parties to the agreements which were 
sought to be reformed, and mistake occurred on the part of one or more of the parties.)2 
The Utah legislature has recently enacted the Utah Uniform Trust Act, which 
provides in section 75-7-415: Reformation to correct mistakes, that "[t]he court may 
reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor's 
intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor's intent 
and the terms of the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in 
expression or inducement. (2004) This statute has not yet been interpreted by this 
Court or the Utah Court of Appeals. 
2
 In each of the cases cited, Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520 (Utah 1980), Peterson 
v. Eldredge, 246 P.2d 886 (Utah 1952), and Sine v. Harper, 111 P.2d 571 (Utah 
1950), there were two parties to the agreements which were sought to be reformed, and 
mistake occurred on the part of one or more of the parties. This a crucial difference in 
whether or not the doctrine of equitable reformation is available, inasmuch as courts 
have been hesitant to reform a document which was originally created as a voluntary 
instrument on the part of the one party, and there is no consideration on the part of any 
other party, and a "mere failure in bounty" occurs. See, 66 Am Jur 2d § 42, citing, 
Smith v. Pattishall, 176 So. 568 (Fla.1937); Landreville v. Mero, 281 P. 749 (Mont. 
1929); Dunn v. Dunn, 87 SE2d 308 (NC 1955); Gray v. Gary, 344 SW2d 329 
(Ark. 1961). 
"The mistake of only one party to an instrument, as occurred here, will not afford 
relief by reformation. Additionally, the party seeking reformation must establish the 
mistake by clear and convincing proof that "clinches what might be otherwise only 
probable to the mind." Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770: (Utah 1985), citing, Greener v. 
Greener, 111 P.2d 194, 204 (Utah 1949); accordBown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292, 295 
(Utah 1984). By extension, when there is only one party to an instrument, such relief 
does not lie at law or in equity. 
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Bill and Jilene in the Brief of the Appellee, direct the Court to the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 333, and comment a. to § 333 to support their position that on 
the facts at hand a trust may be equitably reformed. Section 333 is similar in content to 
the provisions of U.C.A. section 75-7-415. That is, due to a mistake in the drafting of 
the document, reformation would be equitable and allowable. Section 333 basically 
states that the grounds for reforming or rescinding a trust are the same which apply to a 
transfer of property not in trust apply. Bill and Jilene also point to comment a. to § 
333 which states that "...The law governing the rescission or reformation of a transfer 
inter vivos is applicable to declarations of trust and to transfers inter vivos in trust..." 
However, Bill and Jilene fail to advise the Court of the comment to § 333 which 
is most pertinent to the facts at hand, and that is comment e. 
Comment e. to section 333 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts illuminates 
the basis upon which the drafters of section 333 believe that mistake is a basis for 
reformation or rescission. Comment e. begins with the definitive statement that "[t]he 
settlor can rescind a trust created by him as a result of a material mistake." (emphasis 
added). The authors go on to state that u[t]he settlor cannot rescind the trust if the 
beneficiary has so changed his position without notice of the grounds for rescission that 
it would be inequitable to permit the settlor to rescind." Even under the interpretation 
of the law provided by the authors of the Restatement, the grounds of mistake do not 
give Bill and Jilene support for a decision ordering rescission or reformation of the trust 
agreement. Here it is not the settlor that seeks the reformation. 
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B. For the reasons shown below, there have not been adequate findings, 
nor can there be at this point, to provide clear and convincing evidence 
of Leona's intent in order to mandate reformation. Furthermore, 
reformation after the death of the grantor, settlor or testator will always 
be difficult and suspect due to the lack of first hand expressions of the 
grantor's settlor's or testator's intent. 
To allow for the reformation of testamentary documents based on a showing of 
intent, effectively makes the existence of any testamentary document moot if anyone, at 
any time after the death of the decedent could challenge the document and persuade the 
court to reform the document to meet their own interests. 
In the vast majority of situations where a party might seek the reformation of a 
will or testamentary trust, the grantor, settlor, or testator is deceased, and therefore any 
evidence as to the intent of the individual is second-hand at best. Intestacy statutes exist 
in order to provide a basis upon which a decedent's property should pass, as 
determined by the legislature in the best interest of the community, in the event that 
attempts at, or failures to, provide for the disposition of one's property fails. For these 
reasons, public policy must dictate against the reformation of trusts in the case of a 
unilateral mistake, except upon application by the settlor herself. 
In addition, reformation of an instrument in the context of drafting attorney 
negligence, error or malpractice, could result in every instance where one or more 
beneficiaries of a testamentary document is dissatisfied with the document, and one or 
more persons bring an action for equitable reformation. 
As discussed below, the trial court has not made findings of intent sufficieint to 
support a determination that by clear and convincing evidence Leona's intent would 
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mandate reformation of the Leona E. Hoggan Family Trust. 
III. THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON JANUARY 
12,2004 SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND AND BE HELD TO ALLOW 
ADEQUATE GROUNDS FOR FINDINGS OF INTENT BY THIS COURT. 
If the Court determines in its discretion that as a matter of law, equitable 
reformation is an available basis for awarding the relief sought by Bill and Jilene, 
reformation of the trust agreement must still be denied on the basis that Bill and Jilene 
have not met the standards for such relief as required by Utah law, and the findings of 
fact contained in the January 12, 2004 documents issued by the trial court are overly 
expansive and without adequate support in the record. 
Jack has set forth persuasive argument concerning the error of the trial court in 
issuing the January 12, 2004 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Brief of 
the Appellant at pages 25-38. Jack continues to rely on such argument and urges the 
Court to rule in agreement with the arguments set forth regarding the overly broad 
Findings and Conclusions prepared on behalf of Bill and Jilene, and regarding the fact 
that with a Rule 56(f) motion by Jack which was never waived nor ruled upon, and an 
agreement and representation to the trial court that at issue during oral argument was 
only the legal questions of 1) interpretation of the trust document, and 2) was equitable 
reformation a possible remedy under law, and therefore no finding of intent is possible. 
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court judge to expand the factual rulings 
from those necessary for the legal arguments made during the September 22, 2003 
hearing when there was an outstanding Rule 56(f) Motion by Jack, seeking additional 
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time to conduct discovery in the event that such was necessary following the requested 
determinations of law by the trial court pursuant to the motions for summary judgment. 
Jack did not "abandon or otherwise withdraw" his Rule 56(f) Motion during the 
September 22, 2003 hearing on the motions for summary judgment as Bill and Jilene 
suggest. Rather as the transcript of that proceeding shows, the parties understood that 
the purpose of the hearing was to discuss the legal issues of trust interpretation and 
equitable reformation of trusts, prior to the undertaking of further discovery. See, 
Transcript of Proceeding, September 22, 2003, Motions for Summary Judgment, pp. 4-
6, R. 1445. In addition the last filing by Jack prior to this h21earing, the Plaintiff's 
Memorandum on the Effect of the Decision of the Utah Supreme Court in In the Matter 
of Almon J. Flake, contained an explicit statement that the Rule 56(f) had not been 
waived. R. 859. 
The trial court never ruled on Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion, and indeed after the 
issuance of the January 12, 2004 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, additional 
discovery was conducted by Jack which had as one of the purposes the gathering 
information regarding the intent of Leona Hoggan from William E. Hoggan and Bonnie 
J. Weber. See, Certificates of Mailing, various deposition transcript pages included as 
exhibits. RR. 1220-21, 1231-32, 1283-84. 
Despite the allegations of Bill and Jilene, the additional discovery issue sought by 
Jack's Rule 56(f) Motion did not become moot, and has not become moot simply 
because of the stipulation of dismissal of the remaining claims originally stated in the 
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complaint and the waiver of the right to appeal the dismissal. The additional discovery 
issue embodied in Jack's Rule 56(f) Motion goes not only to those other issues, but also 
to questions of intent embodied within Bill and Jilene's raising of the question of 
reformation. 
In sum, the Findings of Fact entered by the trial court on January 12, 2004 are 
not valid because due to the outstanding Rule 56(f) motion, and the agreement among 
the parties to delay discovery on the intent issues until after the September 22, 2003 
oral argument on the points of law, the trial court judge abused his discretion in 
entering the Findings of Fact. Jack was not allowed, nor denied for that matter the 
opportunity to present evidence regarding Leona's intent prior to the expansion of the 
trial judge's initial ruling on the law relating to trust interpretation, by the Trustee, Bill 
and Jilene, to include extensive findings of fact regarding intent. 
For this reason, as stated in the Brief of the Appellant, all but six of the Findings 
of Fact entered on January 12, 2004 should be disregarded when the Court addresses 
the issues raised on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Leona E. Hoggan may have desired to be able to amend the terms and provisions 
of her Trust Agreement at any time, and in any manner she choose, however the Trust 
Agreement as drafted does not give her that power. Under a plain reading of the 
unambiguous language of the document, Leona could only 1) modify, amend, remove 
and/or revoke the property contributed by her to the Trust, and 2) revoke or terminate, 
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other than by death, any of the beneficial interests in the trust, including her own. 
Therefore, the June 9, 2000 and May 24, 2002 documents which purport to amend the 
Trust are without any authority or validity inasmuch as Leona did not have the power to 
amend the beneficial interests under the Trust Agreement. 
Bill and Jilene would have the Court apply the doctrine of equitable reformation to 
the facts at hand and reform the Trust Agreement and the June 9, 2000 and May 24, 
2002 documents to fit what Bill and Jilene contend was Leona's intent for distribution of 
the trust assets upon her demise. As shown in the Brief of the Appellant and herein, 
adequate basis for such reformation does not exist either in law, or upon the less than 
clear and convincing evidence presented by Bill and Jilene. 
Jack E. Hoggan, respectfully requests that the Court consider the arguments 
set forth herein and reverse the decision of the trial court, by holding that no valid 
amendments to the Leona E. Hoggan Family Trust existed, and therefore Jack E. 
Hoggan is entitled to a one-third distribution of the trust assets. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of July, 2006. 
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J. Jay Bullock 
Clinton J. Bullock 
Karen Bullock Kreeck 
BULLOCK LAW FIRM 
Counsel for Jack E. Hoggan 
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